Bounded Command Governance for AI Agents · Triodian

Rules tier · in build

Your AI agent cannot run a command you did not approve. Not filtered. Not flagged. Unemittable.

Bounded Command and Action Governance expresses your tool registry as a closed vocabulary. The agent can choose among approved commands, and nothing else can be emitted: an injected or hallucinated command never reaches an action because it was never in the set the agent can produce.

In build · December 2026Conventional engineering

What it does

Approval steps assume a bad command gets caught. This removes it.

Allow-lists, approval steps and a person in the loop are the right controls, and most of the time they hold. They share one assumption: that a disallowed command is noticed in time. At machine speed, "noticed" is the weak word.

Prompt injection

A request framed to trigger a forbidden action cannot commit it, however it is worded.

Hallucinated tool calls

A tool or command that is not in the registry cannot be produced.

Socially engineered actions

Persuasion changes what the agent wants to do, not what it is able to emit.

How it works

The tool registry becomes the agent's whole vocabulary.

Agent

Proposes an action

Planning, tool choice and arguments, generated by the model.

→

Boundary

Closed vocabulary

The registry, compiled to an automaton, admits only approved commands and typed arguments.

→

Action

Approved or nothing

Only an in-set command reaches the system; the rest cannot be emitted.

Versioned updates

A change to the approved set is a tracked, reviewable event with its own version.

Works with your agent framework

It composes with agent frameworks and tool runtimes rather than replacing them.

Same mechanism as Structured Output Assurance

The automaton is pointed at your tool registry instead of a data schema.

Who it is for

Agents that act, not only advise.

Regulated entities

An agent that can approve, refer or decline a claim or a loan, move money, or change a customer record. Its action space has a provable ceiling: approve, refer, decline, and nothing else.

Operators

An autonomous haul truck, a drill or a process controller taking AI instructions. The closed set is proceed, slow, hold, or hand to the operator.

What it does not do

It bounds which actions exist, not whether one is wise.

A permitted command at the wrong moment

Whether an approved action is appropriate in context is a semantic question. That is Attested Semantic Compare.

Arguments only as far as they are typed

Values are governed as tightly as the grammar types them, and no further.

Software enforcement

An adversary with privileged access to the enforcement host is the reason the hardware appliance exists. For safety-critical actuation, start there.

Evidence rung it fills

Deterministic control, then the hardware appliance

That a forbidden action could not be taken.

Bounded Command delivers this inside the software trust boundary. The rules appliance carries the same closed vocabulary into hardware no software can bypass, with a prototype planned by mid-2027. With the Certifiable Conformance Pack, every admitted action also leaves a record.

Get in touch

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