Hardware · next
Software controls can be bypassed by privileged software, and the record is kept by the system under review. The appliance moves the check into a dedicated hardware datapath between the model and the action it would trigger, and holds the output inside a policy declared in advance.
How it works
01
Holds the parsing state for each request in dedicated logic, against a policy compiled in advance.
02
Computes which next tokens or commands the policy accepts, at every step.
03
Biased to block. A non-accepted output cannot commit.
04
Output is released only when a root of trust attests the loaded policy is unmodified. A one-byte change fails.
The emission interlock
Disabled
Nothing is emitted until the device is attested.
Attest
The root of trust measures the loaded policy.
Enabled
Accepted output is released, with a token for each emission.
Blocked
A violating output is held, or returned to the model to re-propose within a bound.
Three configurations, one appliance
The rules configuration needs no experiment. The other two each have a gate of their own, declared in advance.
| Configuration | What it adds | Gate before it ships | Planned |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rules | Grammar and command enforcement in a dedicated datapath. No software at any privilege level can bypass it. | None: decidable by construction. The prototype is to be formally verified and bypass-tested against pre-defined attacks. | Prototype mid-2027 · deployments 2028 |
| Distribution | A certified envelope with a stated miss rate, per constraint. | A certification run per constraint. | Late 2027 |
| Meaning | The semantic check on the same interlock. | A pre-registered experiment of about 10 weeks. If it fails, rules and distribution are unaffected. | First half 2028 |
Where it fits
Regulated finance
Run any model, from any origin, on your own premises, with every consequential output checked in hardware.
Critical infrastructure
For operators where a software bypass would move equipment, and safety and security standards already apply to every other control.
Confidential material
The meaning configuration, if the experiment passes.
Sovereign and defence buyers span all three.
Two ways to use it
Installed
General counsel mandates the evidence; the technology team runs the box, much as it runs a hardware security module.
Hosted
Call an appliance run for you through the open Universal Governance Protocol, and verify each token without trusting the host.
The protocol →The honest boundary
Form, not meaning. Output conforms to the attested policy. Conformance does not by itself guarantee safety, accuracy or appropriateness.
Every path, or no claim. Non-bypassable only where every consequential path passes the appliance. That is proven per deployment.
Trust relocated, not removed. It moves onto the silicon and its attestation chain, which can be inspected.
Built on the Deterministic Governance Architecture, patent pending.